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Abstract 
In recent years, British labour markets have been characterised by a decline of institutional 
regulation of entry routes into many occupations and internal labour markets. This paper 
examines this change by comparing occupational labour markets for selected occupations in 
which institutional regulation has remained largely intact with those in which entry has 
become more fluid. It argues that in the latter case, structured entry paths, which were 
characterised by competition at the ports of entry, have given way to extended entry 
tournaments in which competition is spread over a much longer time period. Using data from 
the New Earnings Survey panel for 1975-2001, it relates the comparatively greater growth in 
earnings inequality in these occupations to the emergence of extended entry tournaments. As 
pay at the top has risen, greater competition for entry at the bottom has held down pay and 
depressed conditions. It argues that many of the aspirant members of these occupations 
compete for entry for too long, and then become trapped as it is too late to change 
occupation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A great many labour markets are characterised by competitive entry. Young workers compete 
for entry into the firms that provide the best career opportunities, and they do so to become 
established in particular occupations. When labour markets are characterised by strong 
institutions, such competition is often concentrated at certain stages in workers’ careers, and 
if they fail to get in, they move on to jobs in less good firms or less prestigious occupations. 
This chapter explores the dynamics of labour markets in which competition for entry has 
become prolonged over a considerable period of a person’s working life, and given rise to 
extended entry tournaments. This can occur because the institutions that previously regulated 
entry have declined, or in the case of new occupations, may never have existed. Although it 
will be argued that such tournaments are not a general feature for all occupations, they are of 
interest because they appear to have developed as other more familiar labour market 
institutions have declined in recent decades. These extended entry tournaments may enrich 
our understanding of the increased income inequality within certain occupations. For 
example, Salverda and Mayhew (2009) argue that the decline of inclusive labour market 
institutions in many countries has contributed to increased pay inequality at the low-pay end. 
Likewise, Goos and Manning (2009), writing about job polarisation in Britain, suggest that 
the decline of protective labour institutions may explain why the growth of ‘lousy’ jobs 
relative to those in the middle, did not improve their relative pay during the period of their 
study. 
 
The background to this study is provided by the spread of more flexible forms of economic 
organisation, and the expansion of project-based working which provide unfavourable ground 
for the traditional models of cost-sharing for training between employer and trainee. The 
theme was taken up by Osterman (1996) in his edited volume, ‘Broken Ladders’, on the 
decline of large organisation internal labour markets in the US, and by Arthur and Rousseau 
(1996) in theirs on the ‘Boundaryless Firm’. Within the EU, the Supiot Report (1999) 
addressed a similar theme, and recommended reform of the employment relationship to cater 
for more transient and fluid employment relationships than in the past few decades, a theme 
taken up also in the discussion of ‘flexicurity’ (Wilthagen et al. 2007). 
 
These changes set out from a pattern that held sway up to the mid-1980s. At that time, it was 
possible to characterise the labour markets for industrial skills in the leading industrial 
economies as falling into two broad categories: firm-based internal labour markets (ILMs), 
and occupational labour markets (OLMs). Whereas firms in the US, Japan and France were 
heavy users of the former kind, those in Britain, like their counterparts in Germany, were 
heavy users of occupational markets (Maurice et al. 1982; Eyraud et al. 1990; Sengenberger, 
1987; Jürgens, 2003; Marsden, 1990). The years up to the late 1970s, roughly speaking, were 
dominated by what many have referred to as the industrial or ‘Fordist’ model of production, 
grouped around large production units, often with strongly institutionalised patterns of 
labour-management relations. By the early 2000s, the industrial labour markets in these 
countries had undergone profound transformation, and particularly in Britain, where 
industrial employment slumped, and new models were developing the fast-expanding 
services sectors. Whereas the internal and occupational labour markets of the 1970s were 
characterized by a high degree of institutional regulation, it is not clear that the organisation 
of entry and progression within some of the growing occupations of the service and the 
‘knowledge’ economy conform to these models. In contrast to the relatively structured and 
well-defined ports of entry for established internal and occupational labour markets of the 
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industrial sector, those in many services activities appear to be more open, with more intense 
and prolonged competition for entry. 
 
This chapter argues that ‘entry tournaments’ have prospered in some of these occupations, 
growing at the expense of more structured entry channels. Their growth is partly associated 
with the rapid growth of top pay, which serves to attract entry candidates, ‘aspirants’, but it is 
also associated with the deterioration of conditions for the lowest paid. The growth of 
project-based employment, with its shorter time commitments, has played a key part in 
opening up the competition to new aspirants. These ideas are explored by comparing the 
situation in service occupations in which such changes have been prevalent with those in 
which more established regulatory structures have been sustained. 
 
 
2. The Growth of Project-Based and Transient Employment Relationships 
 
Project-based employment is not the norm across the economy, as the stability of job tenure 
data demonstrate (Auer and Cazes, 2000). Nevertheless, it has grown in some sectors and has 
reinforced its presence in others where it was already established. It has attracted a good deal 
of attention in recent years because of the pressure on firms to respond more quickly to 
market changes, and because of the fluidity of projects as an organisational form. The 
development of this kind of working has been well documented in the media and IT sectors, 
and more recently in the higher education sector (e.g. Jones and Walsh, 1997; Saxenian, 
1996; Tolbert, 1996; Heery et al., 2004). Project based working has many attractions in the 
creative and intellectual sectors. As Baumann (2002; 2003) has observed, the key added 
value arises in such cases at the stage of conception and design whereas production, and 
copying, is often relatively cheap. Many of the goods and services are akin to fashion goods, 
fast-changing, and with an emphasis on novelty. In contrast to mass production, in the media, 
IT and research sectors, there is a predominance of one-off or small batch production, so 
there are few economies of scale in employment. 
 
The lack of economies of scale in employment has profound implications for the 
institutionalisation of training and labour market entry. Internal labour markets required the 
presence of a sufficiently large workforce so that employers may plan career progression over 
a reasonable period. Likewise, occupational labour markets have usually required a 
significant input from employers to fund the provision of training for transferable skills. This 
also requires a degree of scale and permanency of the organisation. Yet the pressures for 
greater organisational flexibility tend to militate against such organisational patterns, and so 
provide a less favourable environment for institutionalised patterns of labour market and 
occupational entry. 
 
Two other reasons stand out for searching within these areas of employment for new patterns 
of labour market practices. First, the occupational pattern described for the 1970s and 1980s 
was predominantly based on industrial employment, yet this sector has greatly diminished in 
Britain, as in a number of other countries. In Britain, in the 1970s, it still accounted for about 
40% of employment, but by the early 2000s, it represented less than 15%, and was still 
declining. It is therefore unlikely to provide indicators of new models of labour market 
institutions. Second, the growth of secondary and tertiary education since the 1970s means 
that employers can recruit people with a much higher level of general education, and with 
that, better developed skills for self-directed learning. This also affects the supply of workers 
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for such occupations, as it is less constrained by employers’ investments in training than in 
the more institutionalised internal and occupational labour markets. 
 
 
3. Growing Use of Tournaments to Regulate Labour Market and Career 
Transitions 
 
The tournament metaphor applied to labour markets comprises a number of key observations 
which can be drawn from the literature (for example, Lazear and Rosen, 1982; Aoki, 1988; 
Lazear, 1998; Bognano, 2001). It emphasises the generally high level of competition among 
workers of similar status for access to higher status positions. These higher status positions 
should be fixed in number, or at least, their supply should be relatively inelastic with regard 
to the number of aspirants so that there is a degree of rationing of good positions. Aspirants 
gain access to the higher status positions based on their relative merit, a consequence of 
limited supply of good positions. The reward structure should be such as to attract a large 
enough pool of aspirants to maintain the intensity of competition, but also to compensate 
them for the higher risk of failure than in more structured labour market arrangements. One 
must consider also the consequences of failure to gain access to the high status positions. 
Sometimes former aspirants can move into other occupations, but when these have structured 
entry paths, they may find they have left it too late. Hence, one can anticipate that many will 
gradually slide into low status positions within their preferred occupation. 
 
The internal and occupational labour markets that held sway for many types of work in the 
1960s-1970s regulated a number of key labour market transitions. They regulated entry paths 
into good jobs: the ‘entry ports’ into firms’ internal labour markets for many blue and white 
collar jobs; and through apprenticeship-type arrangements for access to skilled and 
professional occupations. Unlike in the tournament-oriented model, these structures serve to 
adjust the supply of entry positions roughly to that of vacancies within the occupation or 
work area. In the case of ILMs, Becker (1975) argued that firms will usually bear most of the 
cost of training because the skills are not transferable, and to minimise costs, they will seek to 
equate the flow of new entrants to their expected future needs, and organise job progression 
so that skills accumulate in an orderly way. Likewise, in occupational markets, although 
Becker’s theory predicts that trainees should bear the cost of training because the skills are 
transferable, in practice, firms often share a substantial part of the cost. They can afford to do 
this if the skills can be made sufficiently ‘sticky’, for example if they are supplemented by 
firm-specific skills, or incentives for staying are provided (see Acemoglu and Pitschke, 1999; 
Stevens, 1994). They can also establish regulatory institutions to share the costs among 
employers and discourage free-riding. Thus, in this case too, employers have an incentive to 
restrict the number of training and entry positions, consequently limiting competition among 
aspirant members of the occupation. 
 
Structured internal and occupational labour markets provide stable frameworks for 
investment by both parties. They do this by introducing a degree of closure in the sense 
described by Clark Kerr (1954) in his account of access to ‘industrial’, or firm-specific, and 
‘craft’, or occupational markets. In both cases, closure was associated with a form of 
regulated transition for new entrants: by recognised ports of entry into firm internal labour 
markets, and by occupation-specific training positions for occupational markets. In relation to 
the tournament metaphor sketched above, these structures, by limiting training places, they 
also limit the number of aspirants competing for entry, and they often also compress the time 
period over which it prevails. 
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Both methods of organising skills and labour markets came under pressure during the 1980s 
and 1990s. Firm internal labour markets involve a high overhead cost, and the skills adapt 
only slowly to changing circumstances. Established occupational markets also take time to 
adapt because of the large numbers of stakeholders who have to agree the new training 
norms: for example, the firms that provide training places and hire from such markets, and 
the workers who invest in occupational skills. Changing technology has put pressure on both 
forms, as has the increased weight of national and international competition. This has made it 
more risky for firms both to invest in building up and maintaining their internal labour 
markets, and to commit long term to the skill structures of occupational markets.  
 
If one strips away these frameworks, it becomes possible for more aspirants to compete for 
entry into the occupation, and to do so over a longer period of time. During this period, they 
need to obtain work in order to acquire the necessary skills and develop their network 
contacts and reputation. The fluidity of employment relationships reduces the incentive for 
employers to provide systematic training, and so reduces one of the brakes on excess supply 
that characterises the more structured labour markets. Thus, whereas organised firm-ILMs, 
apprenticeships, and established professional training, generate a narrow range of entry paths, 
these more open competitions for occupational entry will be associated with a diversity of 
career tracks, such as those illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
The figure provides a stylised representation of the entry process into an occupation where 
there is little pre-established structure in the entry segment, and aspirants have to find work 
assignments, represented by the small boxes, that bring them relevant experience, network 
contacts and help them build up their career portfolios and reputations. The three tracks 
illustrate different ways in which a given cohort of aspirants may progress, or not, towards 
gaining entry to the established segment of the occupation. Unlike in organisational careers 
where jobs are often organised into different career tracks which may be known in broad 
terms ex ante, in this example, there are few such guide posts. Workers know about their 
previous and present jobs or assignments ex post, but can only surmise where they are 
leading. The figure illustrates the idea that the tracks are not linearly upward, but contain 
considerable upwards and downwards variation so that there is always a good deal of 
uncertainty as to which track one is on, and therefore, about one’s likely success in gaining 
access to the established part of an occupation, denoted by crossing the fuzzy grey line in 
Figure 1. This may occur by passing qualifications, but it may also be expressed by means of 
peer group recognition. A notable feature of entry in this example is that it remains open for a 
prolonged period of a person’s working life. This contrasts with highly structured 
occupational and internal labour markets where there is usually a clear point at which the 
aspirant is either in or out. In these more open systems, there is also a risk that aspirants 
continue to compete for entry long after their opportunities in other occupations have started 
to close down. Thus, there is a likelihood that some will become trapped in the ‘slow stream’, 
and have to make do with precarious employment conditions and low pay because it has 
become too late to enter more structured occupations. 
 
Given that some occupations provide institutionalised and predictable channels, why should 
aspirant employees compete to enter these occupations which offer only unstructured entry 
transitions? In particular why should anyone take the risk of becoming stuck on the slow 
track? In some creative occupations, hedonic motivation can provide a strong pull: ‘art for 
art’s sake’. High financial rewards may also provide a risk premium to compensate for the 
increased risk of failure to gain entry. As will be seen shortly, the rewards at the top of some 
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of these organisations have risen considerably in recent years. Those same rewards may also 
compensate them for the cost of acquiring skills, experience and contacts. 
 
The looseness of institutional structures regulating entry may also contribute to aspirants 
becoming trapped. First, some aspirants may just be dazzled by the prizes, and like gamblers, 
just keep on placing more bets in the hope that one day their luck will change, and they will 
get that elusive break. Secondly, because the tracks shown do not correspond to well-
organised career paths, it is difficult for aspirants to know ex ante on which track they are 
currently located. The tracks are observed ex post. The random element reflected in the 
fluctuating occupational status of successive assignments on all tracks makes reliable 
identification more difficult. For example, does the fourth assignment on the slow track mean 
that one is actually on the middle track, or is it just a piece of temporary good fortune? This 
means that by the time one realises one is condemned to life on the slow track, it may be too 
late to move to other occupations. One is trapped. 
 
A third factor contributing to locking people in relates to the size of the stake associated with 
each assignment. Because one moves through many assignments rather than entering upon a 
single training programme, the financial stake at risk at each step is correspondingly smaller. 
Yet the eventual prize is unchanged. Thus, if aspirants write-off their past investments, and 
focus only the current one, then many will persist in taking on new assignments even though 
a hard look at their past experience should tell them they are on the slow track. This process 
too would tend to encourage aspirants to continue to seek assignments to build up their 
portfolios until they become trapped. 
 
The final piece of the jigsaw concerns the advantages for firms. They benefit from their 
reduced training costs when employees bear more of the cost of gaining experience, and they 
also benefit from employees’ apparent willingness to remain in the occupation’s outer orbit 
long after their prospects of entry have declined. Such savings are likely to offset the pay cost 
of the small minority at the top. Such advantages for employers might apply across many 
occupations, but there is a further incentive advantage, related to the quality of performance, 
and which makes such tournaments more appropriate to some occupations than others: the 
subject of the next section. 
 
The potential client benefits of tournaments in the less structured occupations  
There is a special problem of quality assurance in occupations in which more transient 
project-based employment has flourished. By the time quality problems have become 
apparent, the project may have been long-completed and the team members dispersed. This 
contrast with organisations that provide long-term employment, in which career-pay and 
promotion provide incentives for long-term performance and for good quality work when that 
quality is not immediately apparent to the employer. It also contrasts with long-established 
professional work in well-structured occupations. They often have their own licensing 
arrangements and disciplinary bodies, and their work is also often integrated into long-term 
positions in organisations, such as medical occupations employed by the National Health 
Service. In the more transient employment relationships of project-based work, these 
mechanisms are often weak or lacking. Other incentive devices are needed. A notable feature 
of project-based work is that it involves intensive work at the stage of conception, but its 
reproduction is often low-cost and involves the work of other categories of employees 
(Baumann, 2003). A piece of investigative journalism, an advertising video, a research 
project or a new piece of software all require major initial investments, but unlike 
6 
manufactured goods or care services, reproduction and distribution are very cheap, and the 
services of those who carried out the project are no longer required.  
 
In a nutshell, the argument is that when a greater role for project-based employment is 
combined with serious short-term quality of performance concerns, then employers can 
benefit by restricting the number of key positions, and paying a higher price, even though 
there may be many other equally competent people available to fill them. Apart from 
competition to enter, restricting the number and raising the reward increases the penalty for 
individuals who let their performance slip once in one of the top jobs. In effect, the top jobs 
become akin to ‘positional goods’ part of whose benefit derives from their restricted supply 
(Hirsch, 1977). 
 
Journalism, the media, academia, software and consulting are interesting because they 
provide illustrations of occupations in which project-based employment and entry 
tournaments have come to play an increased role, compared with other more structured 
occupations such as engineering, law enforcement, and health care professions. The top 
‘prizes’ in the first kind of occupations are restricted and often highly visible. The Sutton 
Trust’s (2006) report on journalism highlighted the growing polarisation within that 
occupation. Top journalists can get very high pay, and the older institutionalised entry paths 
have been allowed to decay. The positional good dimension of top jobs can be explained as 
follows. All journalists depend on sources for their stories, and news which is regularly of 
great interest, such as in politics, depends on access to a small number of key sources. Senior 
politicians and government ministers have their circles of trusted journalists to whom they 
may provide important but unattributed information, e.g. ‘sources close the Prime Minister’, 
and confidential briefings so that journalists have the necessary background to interpret 
statements and events (The Guardian 19.6.06). Such confidences depend on knowing whom 
one can trust, and the need for trust restricts the number of people who can enter into these 
relationships. Indeed, not only is a degree of intimacy a product of the need for trust, but it 
also provides a potential sanction. Journalists who betray that trust know that they will be 
excluded from the circle. 
 
At the opposite end, the crowding effect at entry was highlighted by the Sutton Trust, which 
noted that apart from a limited number of graduate internships: ‘The only openings on 
national dailies are provided by freelance shifts, where money is poor and there is no job 
security. A lucky few will secure that coveted permanent post’, Sutton Trust (2006: 12). It 
observed that similar conditions applied to entry into television journalism. The same report 
also noted that in earlier decades, newspapers and the broadcast media had provided more 
systematic entry routes into the occupation, and that it had been possible for a former 
generation of newspaper editors to rise from non-journalist positions on their newspapers to 
prestigious editorships (The Guardian 19.6.06). Client organisations may also benefit from 
the low pay and flexible employment of the aspirant members as this releases resources 
which can contribute, in part, to the funding of higher pay at the top. 
 
In the media sector also there are mechanisms that tend to focus potential rewards on a small 
number of key activities. Although new technology makes it easy to post work on the 
internet, as on ‘YouTube’, getting a creative work to the right audience, and one that is large 
enough to cover production costs, is another matter. Major creative works of a kind that can 
gain a wide audience and generate large revenues are necessarily small in number so that 
recruitment of top artists by the production companies is critical. Of course, many other 
artists can earn a living in less high profile activities, in smaller specialist films, or in 
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advertising videos for example, but their incomes will be closer to the average. High rewards 
also bring sanctions: a string of disappointing performances will force the former ‘star’ to 
return to secondary roles. The British Film Institute has conducted a number of surveys on 
employment and careers in the British film industry. These highlight the precarious 
employment of new entrants, and the difficult transition to becoming a permanent and 
recognised member of the sector. It also highlights, in common with journalism, the very low 
starting rates of pay, and the frequent interruptions to income in between projects (Pettigrew 
et al. 1997). Similar processes of occupational entry have been observed in the US, in 
Hollywood, by Jones and Walsh (1997). 
 
In the academic world, where career paths were once highly institutionalised, one may 
observe the emergence of similar processes, albeit on a more limited scale. For example, 
funding of major research projects has become more focused on an elite group of research 
universities. A recent study by Lam (2003; 2005) highlights how major companies that want 
to conduct joint research with universities target ‘star’ scientists. Such targeting serves a 
number of functions. The companies know that the research universities themselves provide a 
degree of peer group quality control through selection and promotion decisions at which they 
would not be competent. The sums of money are big enough for the scientists to maintain 
teams of researchers to work on key areas of commercially relevant basic research, but by 
their size, they also represent a concentration of resources. Finally, as in the journalist 
example, concentration provides sanctions: there are competitor universities and departments 
that would undertake the work if the chosen team fails to deliver, or is careless with 
commercially sensitive information. The ‘prizes’ for top academic scientists may be 
financially less attractive than in many activities, but as alternative incentives there are 
scientific prestige and provision of the research resources.  
 
A similar process may be at work in university teaching with the growth of a global market 
for international students. Leading universities attract international students by having 
famous professors, or at least those who are well-known in the universities sending students 
for further study. Ranking of universities in international league tables also tends to highlight 
the most successful, raising their visibility, and enabling them to attract the most able 
students. Competition for entry means that whatever the quality of the education actually 
provided, students’ success in gaining entry is a key labour market signal for their future 
careers. Alumni networks may reinforce this particularly if they are active in job markets. 
The Parisian Grandes Écoles provide a similar illustration in which reputation enables these 
schools to cream off the best applicants. In such cases, the fact that potential students and 
their families can only digest limited information about university quality favours the small 
group with the highest reputation. It therefore becomes essential for individual universities to 
remain among the leading group if they are to continue to succeed in recruitment, and this 
puts pressure on the universities to move towards a ‘star system’ for recruitment. 
 
At the opposite end of the academic labour market, in Britain, many universities, and 
particularly the major research universities, now have very high levels of temporary 
employment among their academic staff: two thirds of those at Cambridge and Oxford, and 
just over half at LSE, figures that correlate strongly with the university research ratings.1 
                                                 
1 These figures were extracted from the university performance league tables for 2000, published by the Times 
Higher Education Supplement in its issue of 14.4.2000. The median percentage of non-permanent staff across 
Britain’s 97 universities was about 40%. Overall, there is a correlation of 0.77 between university research 
ratings in the national Research Assessment Exercise and the percentage of non-permanent staff. The RAE is 
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Many of these workers are engaged on research projects, as research assistants, post-docs, but 
also teaching assistants who ‘free up’ the research time of permanent faculty. However, their 
numbers far surpass what can be absorbed into established university careers. 
 
In the software and management consulting occupations similar processes appear to be at 
work. The quality of creative work is hard to assess in advance, and client organisations rely 
heavily on their contractors to provide top quality performance. If a client organisation hires 
the services of a top software or management consultant, then it knows that its reputation is at 
stake if poor quality work is provided. Thus, for sensitive or important projects, the client has 
good reason to opt for the supplier with the strongest reputation. A system of enhanced 
rewards for top performers in such circumstances can be functional. 
 
Thus, in all of these examples, even though the entry tournaments may not have emerged by 
design, they would appear to fulfil a positive economic function for the organisations using 
them. In the less structured careers and looser organisational attachments of project based 
employment, the reputations of individuals and teams for the quality of their work shape their 
future prospects. By focusing resources on those with the top reputations, client organisations 
gain additional leverage should performance fall below expectation. Thus the top journalist 
who betrays confidences of influential politicians, the top academic scientist or the leading 
software engineer who mismanages a major project for a client organisation will suffer a loss 
of reputation and access to future collaborations. 
 
The contrast with the more structured occupations is striking. These groups were chosen 
because they continue to benefit from strongly institutionalised labour markets: in the police 
case from a strong internal labour market, and in case of engineers, legal and health-care 
professionals, from strong occupational markets. Engineers, solicitors and health-care 
professions have a strongly entrenched form of occupational licensing which establishes a 
well-codified system of entry into these occupations. The police service too has a well-
codified system of rules governing entry into its internal labour market. The partial exception 
to this picture is that of medical doctors. The LFS gives the picture for all medical 
practitioners, but the NES earnings data relate only to employees, and thus cover mostly 
hospital doctors, as opposed to general practitioners who are self-employed. Although the 
rules are clear concerning the work of fully qualified doctors, a substantial proportion of 
those working in hospitals are ‘aspirant’ doctors who are still undergoing their training. These 
are the so-called ‘junior doctors’ who can be pressed into working extremely long hours 
because they are in a weak bargaining position prior to acquiring full professional status. 
However, excess supply in this case is limited because the employer pays a large share of the 
direct costs of training, although it may arise temporarily from inadequate planning. 
 
It is also questionable, in these occupations, whether tournaments at the top would play the 
same kind of beneficial role outlined for those in group A. The health care and police services 
are organised to provide a good quality of service to all citizens equally. This is strong 
contrast to the drug company seeking to engage with top scientists in order to develop new 
market-beating compounds, or to film companies seeking to make a blockbuster film. In 
these cases there are big rewards for the groups which can develop a superior product 
compared with their competitors. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
one measure of success in the competition for research funds, and it also serves as a quality index in the search 
to attract overseas students. 
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4. Employment Conditions in ‘Tournament’ and in ‘Structured’ 
Occupations 
 
One may explore these issues more systematically by comparing two groups of occupations: 
Group A, in which entry channels have become more open and careers have become less 
clearly defined, and Group B, that have by and large retained their established career 
structures and entry channels. Group A reflects the conditions outlined in Figure 1, whereas 
Group B represents those where structured internal and occupational labour markets have 
proved more resilient. A crude indicator of difference and change can be found in the 
evolving employment status of those in such occupations, and notably the growth in self-
employment as this implies a radical change in the relationship between individual workers 
and the organisations hiring their services (Table 1). As the self-employed, almost by 
definition, do not have organisation-based careers, it also implies a change in the way in 
which the occupation is organised. Instead of promotion, people have to work on building 
reputation, peer recognition, and their ability to command improved conditions in the market 
place (Tolbert, 1996). Another indicator of changed career practices can be found in the share 
of part-time employees (Table 2). Generally, those in part-time positions find it difficult to 
stay on the career ladder. Among the Group A occupations, the growth of part-time 
employment has generally been stronger than for Group B, the big exception being nurses for 
whom the career hierarchy is in any case rather flat. 
 
The practice of maintaining employees’ pay during short absences from work has long been 
associated with career employment. In the mid-twentieth century, this was one of the key 
differences between the employment conditions of ‘hourly paid’ blue collar workers, and 
‘weekly paid’ white collar workers. Thus an erosion of this principle in qualified white collar 
occupations could signal a major change of status for certain groups within them. Across the 
economy as a whole, the practice of paying employees during short absences spread, but it 
decreased in a number of group A the occupations, mostly notably among journalists, higher 
education academics, and medical practitioners. 
 
Thus, in the Group A occupations, there appears to have been a significant shift in the nature 
of career employment, and consequently an erosion of the entry paths that used to guide 
aspirant members into them. In contrast, the occupations in Group B appear to have 
maintained their established internal labour markets, as in the case of the police, or the 
established structures for occupation and entry in the other cases. 
 
 
5. Changing Opportunity Structure in the ‘Tournament’ and ‘Structured’ 
Occupations 
 
A further piece of the jigsaw is provided by earnings data for employees in these occupations 
over the period. If a shift towards the entry tournament model sketched out above captures 
key elements of change in the occupations in Group A, then one would expect the prospect of 
increased earnings at the top to go hand in hand with greater uncertainty about entry at the 
bottom. Indeed, according to tournament theory, high potential rewards for the successful are 
required to encourage sufficient numbers of new aspirants to compete to enter the occupation 
and progress within it. Thus one would expect the earnings of the aspirants to drift behind 
those at the top. In contrast, in the occupations where entry is more structured, one would 
expect the institutions regulating entry to generate a greater degree of solidarity among 
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members of the occupation. Although the NES provides data for employees only, it is likely 
that there are strong spill-over effects between employee and self-employed earnings as there 
is a certain amount of mobility between these two statuses. 
 
The overall pay picture for Britain between 1975 and 2001 has been one of steadily rising pay 
inequalities, with those on the highest levels of pay pulling away most from the rest of the 
employed population (Belfield, 2006). The charts in Figure 2 summarise the changes for the 
individual occupations under consideration and for all employees across the whole economy. 
They show changes in real weekly earnings at selected percentiles, p10, p90, and p95, 
between 1975 and 2001, deflated by the 2001 retail price index. Weekly earnings were 
chosen for the charts because they reflect better the earnings attached to the jobs on offer in 
these occupations, and notably capture important elements of the pay associated with the kind 
of part-time and short-term jobs that aspirants often accept in order to get a foot on the ladder. 
Table 3 summarises the same data, showing changes between the three-yearly averages at 
either end of the period, but does so for hourly earnings as well, and also with and without the 
effects of pay loss from short absences, another indicator of precarious work conditions. The 
charts also compare weekly pay with and without loss of pay from absence for the lowest 
decile. 
 
The growing gap in absolute real earnings between p95 and p10 is a feature of all the less 
structured occupations of Group A, whether we consider weekly or hourly earnings, and 
whether or not we include the effect of pay loss from short absences. The one exception in 
this group concerns hourly pay not affected by absence among academics. In contrast, among 
the more structured occupations of Group B, on the whole, those at the bottom decile have 
narrowed the gap in real pay with those on the 95th percentile. The main exception appears to 
have been for weekly pay including pay loss from short absences among salaried doctors and 
nurses. In the first case, there has been a rise in the share whose pay was affected by absence, 
and in that of nurses, there has been a large increase in part-time working, and thus in both 
cases, probably some erosion of their occupational status since the 1970s. 
 
Thus the overall picture is one of less structured careers and increased exposure to economic 
uncertainty in the first set of occupations, and of the maintenance of established employment 
structures and protections in the second group. Accompanying this divergence of 
employment statuses, there have been parallel changes in earnings inequalities. In the first set 
of occupations, consistently with the tournament metaphor, there has been a widening of pay 
inequality, especially with the very top earners surging ahead, and the lowest earners facing 
stagnating real earnings and increased uncertainty. An analysis of the composition of the 
lowest paid 20 percent shows that there has also been a tendency for the part-time working 
and exposure to loss of pay to concentrate in the older age groups in the bottom 20 percent of 
earners in these occupations, a symptom of being trapped in that position2. In contrast, the 
Group B occupations, in which employment and career structures have been maintained, one 
can see that earnings inequalities have mostly fallen somewhat. 
 
An important feature of the argument about tournament occupations concerns the degree to 
which older workers may become trapped in the low paying segment. The NESPD provides 
some tentative evidence on this. The panel element of the NES provides a set of overlapping 
career snapshots as some employees remain in the sample over several years. Table 4 
presents a set of pooled logit regressions for the selected occupations showing the predictors 
                                                 
2 Not shown in this article, but available from the author. 
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of an individual employee’s being in the bottom or the top quintile range (20%) of weekly 
earnings for their occupation in a given year. The results for the individual occupations are in 
the appendix. To capture the career element, lagged earnings are included for the previous 
three years. Three was chosen as a compromise between length of career information and loss 
of observations from attrition. There is considerable inertia in both the bottom and top 20% in 
both sets of occupations, as shown by the strongly positive coefficients for the employee’s 
presence in the bottom or top 20% in the preceding years. As expected, being part-time, 
having pay affected by absence, and being female increase the chance of being in the bottom 
20% of earners. The number of yearly observations for an individual is likely to reflect 
employment stability, and so to correlate with higher pay. 
 
Behind the two groups of occupations lies a contrast between the loosely structured careers 
on Group A occupations and the organisationally-based careers of Group B occupations. As 
might be expected, career progression in the more structured Group B occupations would 
carry the lower paid out of the bottom 20%, reflected in the negative relationship between 
being aged over 40 and low pay. In contrast, in the more loosely structured occupations of 
Group A, being aged over 40 increases the likelihood of being in the bottom 20%: consistent 
with the idea of many older workers being trapped. Job changing reveals a similar contrast. 
The frequency of recent job changes helps those in the loosely structured Group A 
occupations reach the top paid 20%, but it has the opposite effect in the more structured 
Group B occupations. For these, it seems that frequent job-changing means exclusion from 
career progression. Similarly, being newly hired in the loosely structured occupations has 
little significant effect on pay, whereas in the more structured Group B occupations, the 
increased likelihood of being low paid is consistent with the practice of hiring into lower paid 
entry positions, and at the bottom of career ladders. 
 
The interaction between job changing and being aged over 40 is also revealing. Whereas 
frequent job changes benefit those in the loosely structured Group A occupations overall, for 
those aged over 40, the relationship switches: frequent job changes for older workers signal 
exclusion from the top 20% of earners. Likewise, whereas being a new hire is associated with 
a reduced chance of being low paid overall, for new hires aged over 40, the chance of being 
low paid is increased. Being a new hire aged over 40 is also associated with lower pay in the 
more structured occupations, but to a markedly lesser degree. 
 
Thus, although there is considerable pay inertia among both groups of occupations as those in 
the bottom and top 20% of earnings tend to stay put from year to year, the effects of the two 
types of career systems are revealed by the relationships with age and job changing. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Before concluding, it is worth considering some alternative interpretations to that favoured in 
this paper. Skill biased technical change has been a powerful and relatively successful 
argument to explain the growing pay inequality in labour markets across a number of 
countries during the period since the 1970s (Autor and Levy, 2003). However, the effects of 
technology on jobs are fairly widely diffused, and do not seem to explain the different 
experience of the two sets of occupations considered in this paper. Likewise, increased 
educational supply could generate a crowding effect at the bottom of the labour market and 
help to explain why workers on the bottom decile in general have done badly. However, it 
does not explain why they should have done relatively well in the more structured 
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occupations. The job polarisation thesis of Goos and Manning (2009) can explain many of 
the features observed in this chapter, but would also need to explain the differences between 
the two groups of occupations. However, there is not obvious reason why jobs in the middle 
of the Group A occupations should have become more routinised than those in the middle of 
Group B. The thesis advanced in this chapter is not necessarily in contradiction with any of 
these models, and could well be complementary. Likewise, in relation to Salverda’s and 
Mayhew’s (2009) argument about the influence of inclusive industrial relations, the present 
chapter could be considered to highlight an additional institutional mechanism to those they 
emphasise such as encompassing collective agreements and extension clauses.   
 
The focus of this paper has been on the changing pattern of labour market careers in selected 
occupations and its effect on segmentation in Britain since the 1970s. In that decade, it was 
possible to describe Britain as one of the countries in Europe, along with Germany, in which 
occupational structures dominated employment compared with the importance of firm 
internal labour markets in countries such as France and Italy. The massive decline of the 
industrial sector in Britain makes it a less promising area in which to search for newly 
emerging patterns of labour market segmentation. Consequently, the this chapter has focused 
on service activities, and contrasting a selection of those in which less institutionally 
structured project-based forms of employment have developed with a similar selection of 
those in which stronger patterns of institutional regulation have remained intact. The special 
conditions that favour the first group mean that it is unlikely to become a general model for 
the whole economy. Nevertheless, because its organisation responds to growing needs for 
flexible patterns of production and service provision, and because it is adapted to many 
aspects of creative activities for which there is a strong demand, one can expect it to grow in 
these areas. 
 
It was argued that the actors in these sectors still have to deal with such issues as skill 
acquisition and flows of suitable job applicants, but because of the more transient nature of 
employment, and of many employing organisations, it was less suited to traditional methods 
of training. It lacks the stability for the provision of internal labour market training, and it 
also lacks some of the foundations for apprentice-type training for occupational markets. It 
was argued that this discourages employers from funding training for transferable skills, and 
that therefore more of the burden falls onto the aspirant members of the occupation. 
Employees have to acquire these skills mostly in employment, working on project 
assignments, and build up their portfolios as they move from one assignment to another. The 
relatively open entry at this stage brings about a large number of aspirants competing for 
assignments, to get their foot in the door. Employers can make this work by allowing the pay 
of the top earners to drift upwards in order to increase the potential rewards for successful 
transition into the occupation. 
 
A rough and ready test of this hypothesis was provided by comparing the earnings patterns 
within broad occupations, some likely to include these tournament-style transitions and some 
with more traditional ones. It was found that the pay of those on the tenth percentile fared 
worse in the former than in the latter group of occupations. Clearly, at this stage of the work, 
these results are suggestive, and more work needs to be done on related aspects of the 
tournament entry model. For example, Landers et al. (1996) looking at entry into US 
professions observed that willingness to work very long hours was a part of the process. 
Likewise, other indicators of precarious employment among the aspirant entrants need to be 
explored, such as job durations. It is also necessary to explore further the filtering process 
between those on the fast and medium tracks in Figure 1 and those on the slow track who 
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never manage the transition. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence in the occupations 
considered that after a certain age, a good proportion of those on the ‘slow track’ drift into a 
sort of secondary labour market within these occupations, working occasionally and for low 
pay and little security. More work also needs to be done in order to assess how far the entry 
tournament processes contribute to our understanding of other changes in labour markets over 
the period. 
 
Although one can understand why such tournament style transitions might develop in these 
occupations, there is an important question as to whether it is desirable for society as a whole. 
Apart from the question about desirable levels of overall inequality, there is a related question 
as to the cost of access. One finding of the Sutton Trust was that over recent decades, the 
growth of entry by long periods of precarious employment had made journalism into a much 
more elitist occupation. Aspiring entrants needed the support of their families while they 
worked on low and uncertain pay, so that family capital had become a greater determinant of 
success. This was visible in the increased proportion of top journalists from independent, fee-
paying, schools and from elite universities. Likewise, university-based scientific research 
requires large numbers of researchers on doctoral student grants and on post-doctoral 
schemes, all of which involve low levels of income. The ability to sustain this for long 
periods requires either that family life is postponed, or that families provide a measure of 
financial support. Students from low-income households who have already built up debts 
from their undergraduate studies would find such burdens extremely hard to bear. 
 
The other less desirable face of these developments concerns those who get caught in the 
secondary segment within their chosen occupation. The link between being aged over 40, job 
changing and low pay in the loosely structured occupations, shown in Table 4, highlights the 
problem of those who are potentially trapped on low incomes and a succession of temporary 
assignments. A ‘bohemian’ lifestyle may be attractive in one’s twenties, but it becomes less 
so when raising a family, or contemplating old age without an adequate pension. 
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Appendix on Sources and Definitions 
 
Note on sources and definitions: the New Earnings Survey is based on a one percent sample 
of employees across all economic sectors of Great Britain, and is carried out by the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS). The sample is based on national insurance numbers, and returns by 
employers. Earnings relate to cash earnings before tax and other deductions, and relate to a 
specific pay period in April each year, and include a proportionate amount of regularly paid 
bonuses. The tables and charts in this paper were calculated from NES panel data (NESPD) 
which comprises a subset of variables for the period 1975-2001. From 2001, the NES was 
superseded by the Annual Statistics on Hours and Earnings, ASHE. The panel element of the 
data set arises because every year returns are requested for about 75% of the previous year’s 
sample. 
 
The Labour Force Survey collects information from households and therefore covers a wider 
range of employment statuses, and notably the self-employed, who are excluded from the 
NES. The LFS does not include data on self-employed earnings for the years of this study. 
 
A major problem for the study of occupations over the period was the change from the ‘KOS’ 
classification system to the ‘SOC1990’ system from 1991 onwards. For the LFS and the NES 
a visual matching of the closest occupations was made by the author using detailed 
information on the categories used in the two classifications. Because of the break, several of 
the tables show results for the period just before and just after the changeover. For the NES, it 
was possible also to use the panel element in the survey to assist with matching between the 
two classifications, and thus use the information on the occupational affiliation of the same 
individuals before and after the changeover. I am grateful to Richard Belfield for making 
available his back-mapping of the SOC1990 onto the earlier years for this study. As both 
methods have their drawbacks, some tables in this paper show results using both methods. 
 
Occupations used (SOC 1990): 
Group A: 
Journalists: soc1990==380 
Media excluding journalists: soc1990>=381 & soc1990<=386 
HE Academics soc1990==230 
Mgt consultants: soc1990==253 
Software engineers: soc1990==214 
 
Group B: 
Engineers: soc1990>=210 & soc1990<214 | soc1990>214 soc1990<219 
Legal professionals: (soc1990>=240 & soc1990<=242) 
Police (all ranks): soc1990==152 | soc1990==610 
Medical practitioners: soc1990==220 
Nurses & midwives: (soc1990>=340 & soc1990<=341) 
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Tables and Charts 
 
Table 1: Changing employment status within selected occupations 1975-2000: Self 
employed as % of total employment in occupation 
 
 1975 1981 1990 1991 1995 2000 Q4 change  
75-90/ 
91-00 
Group A occupations        
Authors, writers & journalists 22.7 23.4 37.1 42.4 42.6 43.5 +/+ 
Media excl journalists & sports 28.2 39.3 47.7 45.4 50.7 48.8 +/+ 
Higher education academics 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 2.7 4.9 =/+ 
Software engineers 1.1 3.5 6.5 18.3 24.1 20.1 +/+ 
Management consultants na 30.4 47.8 34.4 36.9 29.5 +/- 
        
Group B Occupations        
Engineers (excl software) 6.3 6.9 11.8 11.5 13.1 10.6 +/= 
Legal professionals (j, b & s) 51.5 52.1 50.8 50.8 39.9 39.7 =/- 
Police officers all grades 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.3 =/= 
Medical practitioners 28.8 32.9 34.8 40.1 35.3 34.6 +/- 
Nurses and midwives 0.4 0.8 1.4 1.8 0.9 0.9 =/= 
        
All occupations 8.2 9.6 13.5 13.1 13.7 12.1 +/= 
 
*1981-2000 Q4. Note change of occupational classification 1990-1991. For this reason figures are shown for 
both 1990 and 1991, and the column showing change shows it separately for both periods. 
Source: Labour Force Survey. 
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Table 2: Part-time and pay affected by absence in selected occupations 1975-2001  
 
Panel a. Employees working part-time by occupation  
(3-year averages: % of total numbers in the occupation) 
Occupation 1975-7 1988-90 1991-93 1999-01 Change 
      
Group A occupations      
Authors, writers & journalists 2.7 5.0 9.6 10.6 +/+ 
Media excl journalists & sports 5.9 6.5 7.8 9.4 +/+ 
Higher education academics 6.7 12.0 16.5 24.7 +/+ 
Software engineers 0.8 1.5 1.1 3.4 =/+ 
Management consultants na Na 5.6 5.1 /= 
      
Group B occupations      
Engineers (excl software) 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.8 =/= 
Legal professionals  4.4 7.0 6.7 7.7 +/= 
Police officers all grades 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.1 =/= 
Medical practitioners 25.3 29.0 28.0 25.6 +/- 
Nurses and midwives 24.3 32.9 35.5 41.9 +/+ 
      
All occupations 14.2 18.4 20.6 25.1 +/+ 
 
Panel b. Employees whose pay was affected by absence in selected occupations (3-year averages: % of total 
numbers in the occupation) 
Occupation 1975-7 1988-90 1991-93 1999-01 Change 
      
Group A occupations      
Authors, writers & journalists 2.3 1.8 4.3 4.9 =/+ 
Media excl journalists & sports 4.1 4.7 5.6 3.1 -/- 
Higher education academics 2.3 4.2 7.6 10.0 +/+ 
Software engineers 2.7 2.9 3.7 2.5 =/- 
Management consultants na Na 4.9 2.6 /- 
      
Group B occupations      
Engineers (excl software) 3.5 3.5 3.4 2.3 =/- 
Legal professionals 2.0 3.2 4.2 2.8 =/- 
Police officers all grades 2.3 1.5 1.4 1.5 -/= 
Medical practitioners 5.3 9.5 10.9 8.4 +/- 
Nurses and midwives 8.4 10.6 10.4 9.6 +/= 
      
All occupations 10.1 9.2 8.8 7.1 -/- 
 
Source: NESPD. Note change of occupational classification 1990-1991. Legal professionals include judges, 
barristers and solicitors. 
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Table 3. Summary of growth in real weekly and hourly earnings at selected percentiles 1975-2001 
Change on average between three-year periods 1975-77 and 1999-2001, full and part-time combined. ‘Pnaa’ excluding, and ‘Paa’, including 
those whose pay was affected by absence. Constant 2001 prices. 
 
Occupation P10  P95 gap P10  P95 gap P10  P95 gap P10  P95 gap 
 
Pnaa 
weekly 
Pnaa 
weekly 
 Pnaa 
hourly 
Pnaa 
hourly 
 Paa 
weekly 
Paa 
weekly 
 Paa 
hourly 
Paa 
hourly 
 
Group A occupations             
Authors, writers & journalists 146.5 194.9 ++ 161.5 206.9 ++ 128.4 180.5 ++ 144.1 201.2 ++ 
Media excl jnls & sports 166.1 169.7 + 160.2 175.1 + 145.9 161.8 + 147.7 165.4 + 
Higher education academics 139.7 152.2 + 160.2 142.2 - 19.5 137.4 ++ 139.7 147.7 + 
Software engineers 131.7 171.0 ++ 138.5 174.5 ++ 104.4 187.4 ++ 106.3 178.1 ++ 
Management consultants* 239.1 314.3 ++ 239.1 314.3 ++ 104.7 143.6* ++ 104.7 143.6 ++ 
Group B occupations             
Engineers (excl software) 169.2 160.9 - 171.9 153.4 - 133.8 153.7 + 131.2 148.4 + 
Legal professionals 256.1 191.8 -- 256.1 191.8 -- 254.1 161.4 -- 255.9 154.1 -- 
Police officers all grades 186.1 143.0 -- 197.9 158.6 -- 185.5 142.6 -- 194.1 159.0 -- 
Medical practitioners 237.1 170.4 -- 218.8 166.9 -- 108.4 166.1 ++ 169.8 163.7 - 
Nurses and midwives 145.2 150.6 + 203.2 160.7 -- 104.3 169.9 ++ 196.0 182.4 - 
             
All occupations 107.4 179.4 + 132.7 183.3 ++ 93.2 173.1 ++ 127.6 180.7 ++ 
 
* 1991-2001 only. ‘Management consultants’ were not shown separately for 1975-1990. 
Key: ‘gap’: The single signs, +/-, denote increases for  p95 of up to 25 percentage points greater than p10 over the period; the double signs, ++/--, denote increases more than 
25 points. Earnings deflated by retail price index, 2001=100. 
Note: estimates of hourly pay are based on smaller sample numbers because of lesser availability of hours worked. 
Source: NESPD. 
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Table 4: Summary of logit coefficients: factors predicting the probability of an 
employee’s pay being in the bottom or top 20% of weekly earnings 
 
 Group A    Group B    
 Bottom 20%  Top 20%  Bottom 20%  Top 20%  
 Coef. sig Coef. sig Coef. sig Coef. sig 
         
Bottom or Top: lag1 yr 2.909 **** 2.996 **** 2.116  **** 2.379 ****
Bottom or Top: lag2 yrs 1.362 **** 1.604 **** 1.171  **** 1.379 ****
Bottom or Top: lag3 yrs 0.897 **** 1.256 **** 0.776  **** 1.094 ****
      
No of job changes -0.139 - 0.365 **** 0.059  **** -0.008 - 
Age >40 years 0.247 *** -0.064 - -0.163  **** -0.021 - 
No job changes age > 40 0.049 - -0.239 **** -0.040  - 0.165 ****
New hire (last 12 mo) -0.509 * 0.050 - 0.363  **** -0.176 ****
New hire * age>40 0.941 *** 0.083 - 0.277  **** -0.133 - 
      
Female 0.257 **** -0.272 **** 0.255  **** -0.279 ****
Part-time 2.875 **** -3.104 **** 2.670  **** -2.537 ****
Pay affected by absence 3.326 **** -1.695 **** 3.116  **** -1.665 ****
No of years in survey -0.033 **** 0.005 - -0.035  **** 0.021 ****
Occupation dummies yes  yes  yes  yes  
Year dummies yes  yes  yes  Yes  
N 23,714  23,714  142,202  142,202  
Pseudo R2 0.622  0.588  0.511  0.509  
Clusters 4,818  4,818  18,987  18,987  
 
Significance levels: **** 1%; *** 2%, ** 5%, * 10%. Robust standard errors used, allowing standard errors to 
differ between clusters (multi-year observations for individual employees in the panel data set). Unbalanced 
panel. 
 
Note on variables: Number of job changes: computed from the number of times the employee was reported as a 
new hire in the previous three and current years. New hire: if the employee had been with the current employer 
for less than 12 months. Pay affected by absence: whether the employer reported that the employee’s pay in the 
survey period had been affected by absence. Number of years in the survey: computed from the number of years 
the employee’s id appears in the sample. 
 
Source: New Earnings Survey Panel Data Set, ONS.
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Figure 1: Career tracks for an unstructured occupational entry for a given cohort 
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Figure 2: Growth of weekly earnings 1975-2001 at constant 2001 prices for selected 
percentiles and occupations 
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Key: pnaa: pay not affected by absence, paa, including pay affected by absence. P99 shown for all occupations 
combined only. 
Percentiles: p95, p90, and p10 for those whose pay was not affected by absence. Additionally, at p10 shown also 
for those whose pay was affected by absence. 
Earnings deflated by Retail Price Index, 2001=100. 
Full and part-time combined. 
Source: New Earnings Survey 1975-2001. 
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Appendix Table 1. Logit regression coefficients on the probability of being in the bottom or top quintile weekly earnings for selected 
occupations 1975-2001 
 
Panel A. Group A: Less structured occupations:  
 
 Journalists Media (excl journalists) HE academics Mgt consultants Software engineers 
 Bottom  20  Top 20  Bottom 20  Top 20  Bottom 20  Top 20  Bottom 20  Top 20  Bottom 20  Top 20  
 Coef. sig Coef. sig Coef. sig Coef. sig Coef. sig Coef. sig Coef. sig Coef. sig Coef. sig Coef. sig 
                     
Bottom or Top: lag1 yr 2.893  **** 3.516 **** 2.873 **** 2.796 **** 2.265  **** 3.429 **** 3.558 **** 3.330 **** 3.299 **** 2.598  **** 
Bottom or Top: lag2 yrs 1.472  **** 1.972 **** 1.620 **** 1.758 **** 0.805  *** 1.645 **** 1.620 **** 1.927 **** 1.144 **** 1.045  **** 
Bottom or Top: lag3 yrs 0.954  **** 0.763 **** 1.121 **** 1.411 **** 0.684  ** 1.284 **** 0.780 - 1.301 **** 0.761 **** 1.260  **** 
No of job changes -0.347  * 0.495 **** -0.191 - 0.367 **** 0.446  - 0.308 * 0.390 - 0.316 - -0.305 - 0.164  - 
Age >40 years 0.272  - -0.276 * 0.435 **** -0.314 **** 0.140  - 0.667 **** 0.940 *** -0.471 * -0.035 - -0.110  - 
No of job changes 
 * age > 40 0.453  - -0.255 - 0.153 - -0.228 - -0.794  * -0.140 - -0.790 - -0.203 - 0.383 - 0.137  - 
New hire (last 12 mo) -0.572  - -0.456 - -0.627 - 0.040 - -1.222  - 1.298 **** -0.158 - 1.041 - 0.094 - -0.115  - 
New hire * age>40 0.435  - -0.148 - 0.792 - 0.287 - 2.267  ** -0.541 - 0.961 - 0.451 - -0.438 - -0.919  - 
Female 0.137  - -0.505 **** 0.539 **** -0.094 - 0.074  - -0.382 **** 0.290 - -0.279 - 0.268 - -0.323  * 
Part-time 3.388  **** -3.849 **** 1.930 **** -2.167 **** 4.857  **** -4.516 **** 3.061 **** -2.439 *** 2.078 **** -2.507  **** 
Pay affected by absence 3.184  **** -1.603 * 3.323 **** -1.908 **** 4.776  **** -1.837 **** 3.135 **** -1.045 ** 2.739 **** -1.277  ** 
No of years in survey -0.068  **** 0.002 - -0.056 **** 0.011 - -0.033  * 0.012 - -0.043 - 0.035 - -0.009 - 0.007  - 
Year dummies yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
                     
R2 0.6376  0.6483  0.6159  0.5822  0.7635  0.6548  0.6332  0.6388  0.5205  0.4379  
N 4342  4346  7087  7087  7027  7027  1263  1263  3296  3296  
Clusters 742  742  1681  1681  1182  1182  390  390  892  892  
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Panel B. Group B: More structured occupations:  
 
 Engineers Legal professionals Police (all ranks) Medical practitioners Nurses & midwives 
 Bottom 20  Top 20  Bottom 20  Top 20  Bottom 20  Top 20  Bottom 20  Top 20  Bottom 20  Top 20  
 Coef. sig Coef. sig Coef. sig Coef. sig Coef. sig Coef. sig Coef. sig Coef. sig Coef. sig Coef. sig 
                     
Bottom or Top: lag1 yr 2.847  **** 2.667 **** 2.508 **** 3.737 **** 1.405 **** 1.655 **** 2.341 **** 2.692 **** 1.935 **** 2.546  **** 
Bottom or Top: lag2 yrs 1.498  **** 1.464 **** 0.830 **** 1.540 **** 1.283 **** 1.300 **** 1.159 **** 1.146 **** 0.933 **** 1.325  **** 
Bottom or Top: lag3 yrs 1.027  **** 1.060 **** 1.258 **** 0.651 *** 1.188 **** 1.060 **** 0.859 **** 0.982 **** 0.455 **** 1.131  **** 
No of job changes -0.283  **** 0.064 - -0.384 ** 0.070 - 0.194 **** 0.067 - 0.099 - -0.289 **** 0.078 **** 0.036  - 
Age >40 years 0.234  **** -0.173 **** 0.675 **** -0.535 **** -1.003 **** 0.165 **** -0.375 *** -0.195 - -0.097 ** 0.021  - 
No of job changes 
 * age > 40 0.303  **** 0.154 * -0.378 - 0.194 - -0.362 * 0.350 **** 0.015 - 0.419 **** -0.072 - 0.073  - 
New hire (last 12 mo) -0.475  ** 0.523 **** 0.197 - 0.361 - -0.313 * 0.272 ** 0.292 - -0.489 ** 0.564 **** -0.416  **** 
New hire * age>40 0.821  **** -0.292 - 1.370 * -1.307 ** 1.163 **** -0.520 *** -0.556 - -0.060 - 0.203 * -0.103  - 
Female 0.726  **** -0.696 **** 0.582 **** -0.266 * 0.356 **** -0.491 **** -0.684 **** -0.659 **** 0.208 *** -0.184  **** 
Part-time 3.269  **** -2.014 **** 2.816 **** -2.144 **** 5.234 **** -1.562 - 4.081 **** -2.087 **** 2.840 **** -2.666  **** 
Pay affected by absence 2.429  **** -1.056 **** 3.749 **** -2.272 **** 2.366 **** -0.369 ** 4.900 **** -1.959 **** 3.251 **** -2.067  **** 
No of years in survey -0.012  ** 0.014 **** -0.139 **** 0.013 - -0.065 **** 0.027 **** -0.034 **** 0.043 **** -0.059 **** 0.027  **** 
Year dummies yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
                     
R2 0.5158  0.4896  0.5619  0.5805  0.4099  0.3171  0.7226  0.6011  0.5342  0.5801  
N 28733  28733  3,726  3,726  26,257  26,257  9,028  9,028  74,464  74,464  
clusters 5995  5995  819  819  2,500  2,500  1,286  1,286  8,442  8,442  
 
Notes: Quintile ranges calculated for each occupation in each year using average gross weekly earnings of employees, including pay affected by 
absence for employees present for at least 3 years in the sample, deflated by the retail price index.  
Note on variables: Number of job changes: computed from the number of times the employee was reported as a new hire in the previous three 
years. New hire: if the employee had been with the current employer for less than 12 months. Pay affected by absence: whether the employer 
reported that the employee’s pay in the survey period had been affected by absence. Number of years in the survey: computed from the number 
of years the employee’s id appears in the sample. 
Significance: **** 1%, *** 2%, ** 5%, * 10%. Logit regression with unbalanced panel allowing standard errors to vary by cluster, in this case, 
individual employees. Source: New Earnings Survey Panel Data Set, ONS. 
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